Ongoing
„Take it apart”: how object presentation affects creativity
Mariusz Urbański, Vira Obshanska, Marta Skorodziievska, Kateryna Shyiko, Aleksandra Ulaszewska
The Alternative Uses Test (AUT) is one of the most widely used tools for measuring divergent thinking: participants are asked to come up with as many unusual uses for an everyday object as they can. But does it matter how the object is presented to them?
In this project, we compare three presentation formats: the object’s name alone, a photograph of the whole object, and a photograph of the object disassembled into its component parts. The idea is that seeing an object broken down may help overcome functional fixation – the tendency to think of things only in terms of their typical use.
Our pilot study showed that participants who saw disassembled objects produced more original responses without generating more responses overall, suggesting that visual decomposition changes the quality rather than the quantity of ideas. We also found that generating more ideas increases average originality but decreases the share of truly unique responses – a trade-off with implications for how AUT results should be scored and interpreted. Finally, different presentation formats shifted the types of uses people came up with, pointing to the role of stimulus design in shaping the space of creative solutions.
We are now running a larger, pre-registered study to confirm these findings and develop practical recommendations for designing and interpreting creativity tasks.
The influence of task sequence on deductive visuospatial reasoning
Mariusz Urbański, Róża Sateja (in collaboration with Agnieszka Nowik)
When we reason about spatial relationships – deciding, for instance, whether objects are arranged consistently with a set of given assumptions – we may rely on different mental models. Some arrangements naturally suggest a linear order, others a circular one. But does the type of model we have just been using carry over to the next task?
In this project, we ask whether prior exposure to tasks that favour a particular normative model (linear or circular) primes people to evaluate conclusions in subsequent, model-neutral tasks. Participants work through three blocks of spatial reasoning problems: one using a Likert-type scale (suggesting a linear model), one using geographical names (suggesting a circular model), and one using abstract coloured symbols (with no implied model). By fully counterbalancing the order of blocks, we can test whether the model activated by one type of material spills over into the interpretation of structurally identical problems presented with neutral symbols.
The project combines online behavioural experiments with a laboratory eye-tracking study. Eye-tracking data allow us to examine whether priming effects are reflected in gaze patterns, fixation durations, and the number of shifts between premises and conclusions, offering a window into the cognitive strategies participants adopt and how these strategies change depending on what they have just been doing.
Evaluating the quality of abductive explanations
Mariusz Urbański, Aleksandra Wasielewska
When faced with a surprising or puzzling event, we naturally try to make sense of it by a process known in logic and philosophy of science as abduction. But what makes one abductive hypothesis better than another? And can we reliably measure this?
We gathered a plethora of data in our previous project on abduction, „Modelling of Abductive Reasoning” (NCN Sonata-BIS grant DEC 2013/10/E/HS1/00172). In this project, we develop a systematic procedure for assessing the quality of abductive explanations produced by participants in a detective-style scenario task. Participants are presented with an ambiguous situation and write a report reconstructing what happened and why, based on limited, partly conflicting evidence. The resulting reports vary widely: some propose creative, well-supported hypotheses that address all the gaps in the story, while others leave key questions unanswered or contain internal contradictions.
To evaluate these explanations, we use a multi-phase approach. First, competent judges provide free-form qualitative assessments of the reports, which we then analyse thematically to identify the dimensions along which people intuitively distinguish good explanations from poor ones, such as completeness, coherence, clarity, and the integration of evidence with conclusions. These dimensions are subsequently operationalised as rating scales and used in a structured evaluation round, allowing us to measure inter-rater reliability and relate expert judgments to objective linguistic and structural features of the texts. The overarching goal is to arrive at an empirically grounded, multi-dimensional account of what constitutes a good abductive explanation.
Syllogistic validity and existential assumptions
Karol Wapniarski, supervised by Mariusz Urbański
Aristotelian syllogistic is one of the oldest formal systems in the history of thought, yet some of its foundational questions remain surprisingly open. One such question concerns existential import: which of the 24 classically recognised syllogistic moods require the assumption that the terms they mention are non-empty, that is, that things of the relevant kind actually exist?
This doctoral project traces the problem both historically and formally. On the historical side, it reconstructs how logicians from Aristotle through the medieval Arabic and Latin traditions to Leibniz and the pioneers of modern logic understood and debated the ontological commitments hidden in syllogistic reasoning, using the evolution of the famous Barbara, Celarent… mnemonic as a guiding thread. On the formal side, it provides a systematic classification of all 24 valid moods according to the existential premises their proofs require – first within first-order predicate calculus (using analytic tableaux), and then within the internal framework of syllogistic itself, by exhaustively computing all alternative direct and indirect proof paths. This analysis reveals a grouping of syllogisms that cuts across the traditional four figures and identifies minimal sets of inference rules sufficient to derive the entire system. Finally, all results are verified using the Isabelle/HOL interactive proof assistant, connecting classical logic with contemporary computational methods and contributing to the ongoing philosophical debate about the nature of the transition from Aristotelian to modern formal logic.
The Social Perception of Moral Agency: How Different Actors Are Judged for Their Decisions
Wojciech Zięba, supervised by Mariusz Urbański
This doctoral project examines how people evaluate moral decisions depending on who makes them. Rather than focusing solely on whether a decision is right or wrong, the research investigates how the type of moral agent – such as a human, an artificial intelligence system, or a person occupying a particular social role – influences the way observers judge the same decision.
The project is motivated by the growing presence of AI systems in areas such as healthcare, transportation, law, and finance, where automated systems increasingly participate in decisions that affect human lives. Previous research suggests that moral judgments are shaped not only by outcomes but also by emotions, social norms, and perceptions of the decision-maker’s mind and intentions. The central question of the project is therefore whether identical decisions are evaluated differently when attributed to different kinds of agents.
Empirically, the research combines quantitative and qualitative approaches. Participants evaluate a series of moral dilemma scenarios – based on modified versions of the classic trolley problem – in which the same decisions are made by different agents. This design allows the study to examine how factors such as human vs. artificial agents, gender, professional roles, or underlying ethical principles shape the moral perception of a decision.
The project also investigates how individual differences among observers influence these judgments. In particular, it analyzes the role of beliefs about the uniqueness of human nature, religiosity, prior experience with AI, and cultural attitudes toward technology in shaping moral evaluations.
By integrating perspectives from moral psychology, cognitive science, and AI ethics, the research aims to develop a broader model of how societies attribute moral legitimacy, responsibility, and trust to both human and artificial decision-makers. The findings may contribute to understanding public attitudes toward emerging technologies and inform discussions about the ethical design and social acceptance of AI systems.
Cognitive Dissonance and Moral Rationalisation in Ukrainian Youth: A Mixed-Methods Experimental Study
Bohdana Bun, supervised by Mariusz Urbański
Festinger’s ground-breaking Cognitive Dissonance theory has shaped our understanding of decision-making, moral reasoning and social psychology. Decades of research have mapped this process in controlled laboratory settings, but how it unfolds in real-life moral dilemmas tied to national identity and civic responsibility remains much less understood.
This project examines how personal involvement and the severity of moral consequences shape the experience of cognitive dissonance and the rationalization strategies people use to manage it on example of a realistic socio-cultural context in Ukraine. The topic is timely due to the unique psychological environment, shaped by war, identity shifts, and moral pressure.
A pilot psychometric study (N = 50) has validated the core 6-item cognitive dissonance scale across three moral vignette scenarios, confirming acceptable internal consistency (α ≈ .85) and a broadly unidimensional structure supported by parallel analysis. The main study will recruit 120 psychology students from Kyiv universities using a within-subjects factorial design, combining pre-post dissonance measurement, open-ended moral reasoning prompts, and qualitative rationalization coding.
Executive Functions and Problem-Solving in Primary-School Children: Effects of Structured Creative Interventions
Samin Foroughi, supervised by Mariusz Urbański
Executive functions, such as working memory, inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility, allow children to plan, stay focused and adapt to new situations. Between the ages of 7 and 10 these abilities are still rapidly developing. Conventional computerised training programmes, however, often bring little benefit beyond the trained tasks themselves. Can structured creative activities do better?
This project examines whether creative interventions are associated with measurable changes in executive functioning and problem-solving in Polish primary-school children. Participants take part in weekly sessions over 10–12 weeks in one of three conditions: artistic activities (drawing, role-play, storytelling), cooperative games (group puzzles, rule-based strategy games), or a blended format combining the two. A waitlist group serves as a control. Before and after the intervention, children complete standardised executive-function tasks from the Polish adaptation of the IDS-2 and a set of Tower of Hanoi planning problems.
Since the components of executive function are not yet clearly differentiated at this age, the main outcome is a composite measure of overall executive functioning, while changes on individual tasks are explored separately. The study will be pre-registered. Its aim is to provide evidence-based recommendations for teachers, occupational therapists and curriculum designers.
How cues affect the activation of a mental model in visuospatial deductive reasoning
Róża Sateja, supervised by Mariusz Urbański
When we reason about the order of objects, we tend by default to arrange them along a straight line, even when the material calls for a circle. Our earlier studies with an inherently cyclical material, the phases of the Moon, confirmed that many participants reject conclusions that follow only under a circular arrangement. A short verbal hint about the cyclical nature of the task, however, substantially increased their acceptance. How far can such cues shift the choice of mental model, and do different kinds of cues work differently?
This project compares five conditions presented before a block of Moon-phase reasoning problems: no cue, a reminder that the phases repeat, a verbal stipulation about how to read the task, and the same stipulation supported either by a picture of the lunar cycle or by an abstract picture of a cycle. Comparing the two pictures will show whether visual support works by supplying knowledge about the Moon or a general cyclical schema. Participants then solve structurally identical problems with neutral symbols and with a Likert-type scale, which allows us to test whether the effect of a cue carries over to material that does not mention it. Comprehension questions help distinguish participants who did not understand a cue from those who understood it but chose not to use it.
The project consists of three pre-registered online studies: a validation of the visual cues, the main experiment, and a follow-up study refining the design based on its results.
“Does it feel?”: Phenomenal consciousness and the attribution of moral status to AI, animals and borderline cases
Jan Czarnecki, supervised by Mariusz Urbański
When we decide whether a being deserves moral consideration, or can be held responsible for its actions, we often ask whether it has a mind. But “having a mind” can mean different things: being able to feel and experience (phenomenal consciousness), being able to use information to reason and act (access consciousness), or simply being intelligent. Which of these actually drives our moral intuitions?
This master’s project examines how attributing these three capacities relates to attributing moral status, understood both as moral patiency (deserving moral concern) and moral agency (being morally responsible). The entities studied include humans at different levels of cognitive functioning (an adult, a child, a fetus, a person in a coma and a person with Alzheimer’s disease), animals (a chimpanzee, a parrot, an octopus and an ant), and artificial systems (a chatbot, a social robot and a cognitive robot).
The project consists of two pre-registered online studies. In the experimental study, the same entities are described either in terms of subjective experience or in purely functional terms, which allows us to test whether describing what an entity feels changes how much moral concern and responsibility people assign to it, for both good and wrong actions. In the correlational study, participants rate entities described only by their physical structure and abilities, and we analyse which dimensions of mind are most closely linked to moral status. We also examine whether religiosity and views on abortion and end-of-life care shape judgements about borderline cases such as the fetus and the person in a coma.
The project aims to contribute to moral psychology and to current debates in AI ethics about how we should relate to entities whose mental status is uncertain.
Reasoning patterns in the meat paradox: how meat-eaters deal with a reconstructed ethical argument
Charlie Młodzianowski, supervised by Mariusz Urbański
There is strong scientific evidence that many animals are conscious and capable of suffering. Yet global meat consumption keeps rising. This tension between caring about animals and eating them is known as the „meat paradox.” Social psychology has described the justifications people use to resolve it, such as the claim that eating meat is normal, natural, necessary or nice. Much less is known about the logical structure of this reasoning: where exactly do people resist an ethical argument, and how?
This master’s project examines how meat-eaters respond to a reconstructed argument that leads, step by step, from premises about animal consciousness and suffering to the conclusion „I should stop eating meat.” In semi-structured interviews, participants go through the argument one premise at a time and think aloud. This lets us capture their resistance as it emerges rather than collecting ready-made justifications. We expect resistance to concentrate on premises that remain open to dispute, such as whether eating meat is necessary or whether one person’s choices make any difference. We also expect participants to accept a premise while adding a qualifying claim that neutralises its force, rather than rejecting it outright.
The interviews are analysed with Walton’s argumentation schemes. We identify which premises are accepted or rejected, classify the logical moves used at each point of resistance, and track how participants’ positions change over the conversation, including moments when they withdraw an earlier acceptance. The goal is a typology of reasoning patterns that complements existing psychological accounts of the meat paradox with an analysis of its logical structure.
Finished (within the Reasoning Research Group):
- Non-cooperative strategies in the Loebner contest
- Test & Research Center for Vienna Test System
- Standardized Epistemological Understanding Assessment
- Deductive Flexibility Test